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Transformation at the Margins: Imperial Expansion and Systemic Change 
in World Politics 
 
Jeppe Mulich 
LSE Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Abstract  
Taking the phenomenon of empire as its starting point, this article seeks to provide a framework for 
addressing the question of how and why international systems change over time. Synthesizing 
elements from network-relational analysis and practice theory, I argue that international systems are 
best thought of as being composed of multiple partially overlapping and interrelated hierarchical 
networks. These networks are made up of social ties - as in classic network analysis - but also of 
specific repertoires of practice. Systemic transformations happen through the reconfiguration of 
networks, both through shifts in social ties and through changes in their practices. Empire provides a 
particularly illuminating window into the topic of systemic change, in part because a major driver of 
historical transformations has been the expansion of empires and their encounters with other 
heterogeneous polities across the globe, and in part because a focus on imperial interactions highlights 
the limitations of existing unit-centric perspectives. Drawing on examples from the nineteenth century, 
I illustrate the usefulness of the framework by showing how different regionally anchored systems 
came into contact with the expanding spheres of Western empires and how such points of interaction 
contributed to the development of an increasingly global international system. 
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Coherent, durable, self-propelling social units – monads – occupy a great deal 
of political theory but none of political reality. 
- Charles Tilly1  
 
To study colonization is to study the reorganization of space, the forging and 
unforging of linkages … 
- Frederick Cooper2 
 
 
How and why do international systems change over time? That is among the central questions 
facing scholars of world politics. Focusing on the phenomenon of empire, the present article 
seeks to provide a framework for addressing this topic by examining the elements 
constituting international systems and their variance across time and space.3 My core 
                                                
 
1 Charles Tilly, ‘To Explain Political Processes’, American Journal of Sociology, 100:6 (1995), p. 
1596. 
2 Frederick Cooper, ‘What is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian’s 
Perspective’, African Affairs, 100:399 (2001), p. 206. 
3 There are several problems with the term international system, both in a geographical sense (how far 
is the reach of the international exactly? How many international systems can coexist at any one 
time?) and as a matter of chronology (does the international require the existence of nations, and if so 
when and where do these emerge? Are they universal or historically anchored?). Despite these caveats 
I use the term international system throughout this article due to its prevalence and explanatory 
purchase in IR theory as well as its advantage over the alternative term state system, which places the 
emphasis on units rather than relations. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in 
World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 17-34. For my full definition, see below. 
 3 
argument is that the best way to approach the issue of systemic change is through a synthesis 
of two recent developments in IR theory, namely practice theory and relationalism. By 
thinking of international systems as the aggregate of numerous interrelated networks, and by 
examining the dynamics of these networks in detail, including the repertoires of practice that 
drive their interactions, we can more clearly see how systems are constituted and re-
constituted over time, transforming the way world politics are conducted in the process. 
 Empire provides a particularly illuminating window into the topic of systemic change, in 
part because this form of political organization has dominated so much of human history and 
in part because it highlights some of the limitations of prevailing unit-centric theories of 
world politics. For centuries before the emergence of anything resembling the national-state 
of the twentieth century, empires were the prevalent mode of configuring polities, and inter-
polity relations were, to a large extent, imperial relations. Over the past two decades the 
discipline of IR has begun to grapple seriously with the concept of empire and imperial 
expansion, producing a slew of works on the topic from a wide spectrum of theoretical 
perspectives.4 Some of these works argue for seeing empires as particularly expansive units, 
not fundamentally different from other state types,5 while others cast empires as distinct 
varieties of interpolity systems, qualitatively different from something like the national-state.6  
                                                
 
4 Helge Jordheim and Iver Neumann, ‘Empire, Imperialism and Conceptual History’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 19:3 (2011), pp. 153-6. 
5 See for example Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Charles Butcher and Ryan Griffiths, ‘Between 
Eurocentrism and Babel: A Framework for the Analysis of States, State Systems, and International 
Orders’, International Studies Quarterly, 61 (2017), pp. 328-36.  
6 See for example Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, ‘What’s at Stake in the American Empire 
Debate?’, American Political Science Review, 101:2 (2007), pp. 253-71; Nexon, The Struggle for 
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My conceptualization aligns with the latter end of this spectrum, building on social-
relational definitions of empire while expanding upon them by integrating the relational 
approach with a practice theoretical view of social ties and by placing the emphasis on points 
of interaction between rival empires and between imperial and other heterogeneous polities. 
Empires here are not seen as composed of a single discrete network, but are rather made up of 
multiple networks intersecting with or overlapping one another. In this sense, empires are 
best thought of as particular configurations of networks, often hierarchical, consisting of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires and International Change 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Paul MacDonald, Networks of Domination: The Social 
Foundation for Peripheral Conflict in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Morten Andersen, ‘Semi-cores in Imperial Relations: The Cases of Scotland and Norway’, Review of 
International Studies, 42:1 (2016), pp. 178-203. Beyond the literature discussed here a third approach 
to empire, exemplified by the works of a number of postcolonial and decolonial scholars, has focused 
on the ways in which empire and imperialism have informed the very notion of international relations 
and its academic study. While this approach has generated exceedingly valuable insights into the 
constitution, history and practices of the discipline of IR, what I am interested in here has more to do 
with the dynamics and the historical development of empires themselves than with the intellectual 
history and persistent legacy of their advocates and scholars. For examples of this work, see Robbie 
Shilliam (ed), International Relations and Non-western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and 
Investigations of Global Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2010); Sanjay Seth, ‘Postcolonial Theory 
and the Critique of International Relations’, Millennium, 40:1 (2011), pp. 167-83; John Hobson, The 
Eurocentric Conception of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); J. Ann 
Tickner, ‘Core, Periphery and (Neo)imperialist International Relations,’ European Journal of 
International Relations, 19:3 (2013), pp. 627-46; Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power 
Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
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specific power relations and repertoires of practice. Moreover, these networks are not 
restricted to any single empire or polity, but often span multiple different political entities. 
This view is based on a definition of empire as being characterized by three traits in 
particular: the differentiation of and inequality among subject groups, a hierarchical 
relationship between different components of the empire, and an expansionist impulse 
towards territory and/or subjects.7 This expansionist desire need not be currently acted upon 
but can be a thing of the recent past, meaning that empires in decline are still empires. 
Through the expansion or protraction of empires, networks are reconfigured, practices are 
altered and systemic change is ultimately brought about. I will return to a fuller discussion of 
this definition and the conceptual moves it requires later in the article. 
It is important to point out that while the article focuses on empires and inter-imperial 
interactions for the reasons outlined above, the argument goes deeper than that. Empires are 
not the only polities that defy the categorization of well-bounded units and inter-imperial 
interactions are far from alone in cutting across nominal boundaries. In fact, no polities 
should be thought of as discreet entities existing apart from one another, but rather as 
particular configurations of networks with the potential to be reconfigured or reconstituted 
over time. Interactions do not take place in some space between these networks, but within 
them, sometimes with little regard to formalized boundary drawing. Empire is therefore used 
to illustrate the broader limitations of unit-centric conceptions of international systems and to 
show the value in refocusing our accounts of historical transformations around networks and 
practices.  
                                                
 
7 This definition follows recent scholarship in history and sociology, including Jane Burbank and 
Frederick Cooper, Empires in world history: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 8-11 and Craig Calhoun et al, Lessons of Empire: Imperial 
Histories and American Power (New York: New Press 2006), p. 3.  
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Acknowledging the messiness, complexity and entanglement of historical world politics 
is the first step towards breaking down some of the persistent dichotomies of IR. Imperial 
incursions into the world did not lead to clear-cut binary configurations, but rather a complex 
web of hierarchical relations and diverse practices. Furthermore, colonialism and the threat of 
imperial expansion fostered adaptive strategies and politically novel polity formations across 
the globe. Understanding this process and conceptualizing international systems as consisting 
of multiple hierarchical networks allows us to better grasp the historical trajectory of world 
politics and to fundamentally reject overly simplistic and presentist binaries such as those of 
inside-outside, core-periphery and foreign-domestic, which still underpin the discipline. 
The article proceeds in four steps. First I present a brief overview of existing accounts of 
empire within the international systems literature, focusing on the broadly unit-centric 
perspective and on the new relational approach. Second, I propose a reconceptualization of 
international systems in general and empires in particular, building on and expanding upon 
the social-relational approach in order to overcome some of the shortcomings I see in existing 
accounts. Third, I consider what this reconceptualization means for thinking about 
colonialism and imperial expansion as particular forces of historical change and generative 
adaptation. Finally, I illustrate my conceptual arguments by applying aspects of the analytical 
framework to three specific historical examples, drawn from the period of European overseas 
colonization. These historical illustrations show how different regionally anchored systems or 
polities came into contact with the expanding spheres of European empires and how these 
points of interaction at the apparent margins of empire each contributed to the increasingly 
global international system of the long nineteenth century. 
 
Units, relations and systems 
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Since the birth of the discipline, IR scholars have debated the nature of the international 
system. Recent scholarship has done much to shed light on and broaden this issue through the 
study of historical systems outside the traditional body of examples drawn from modern 
European history. Most arguments still concern similar topics, namely the definition of the 
units of which systems are composed (typically a more or less heterogeneous collection of 
state forms) and the relationship between these units (often simplified as being either 
anarchic or hierarchical). With the danger of doing violence to the complexity of the field, 
recent accounts can be divided into two broad categories: unit-centric approaches and 
relational approaches. These two approaches are necessarily stylized categories, and they 
share many of the same reference points and theoretical baggage. The particular body of 
work on which both of them draw is dominated by a number of second wave historical 
sociologists and historical IR scholars, including Charles Tilly whose scholarship provides a 
good example of the difference in perspective.8 Unit centric accounts thus tend to reference 
Tilly's work on European state formation,9 while relational accounts pair this work with 
                                                
 
8 Other shared touchstones include Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory,’ Millennium, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126-55; John Gerard Ruggie, 
‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,’ World Politics, 
35:2 (1983), pp. 261-85; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1: A History of Power 
from the Beginning to 1760 AD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Fore overviews, see 
George Steinmetz (ed.), State/Culture: State-formation after the Cultural Turn (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999); Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens and Ann Orloff (eds.), Remaking 
Modernity: Politics, History, Sociology (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), especially pp. 1-72. 
9 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1975); Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1992). 
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Tilly's later scholarship on process-oriented analysis and relational conceptions of social 
phenomena.10 In the following section I discuss these two approaches, focusing specifically 
on their different explanations of empire in order to highlight their analytical strengths and 
shortcomings.  
The first approach sees international systems as systems of states first and foremost, in 
order to make comparisons between different types of systems, to track the historical 
development of the state, or to draw parallels between present-day foreign policy challenges 
and great power rivalries of the past. This approach casts empires as a specific type of unit, 
often a historical variation of or precursor to the nation-state – essentially as a certain type of 
expansionist great power. Traditionally, this perspective has emphasized the rivalry between 
competing imperial states operating under anarchy, but in some newer accounts the emphasis 
is placed upon historical systems that either operate under different conditions than anarchy 
or that see empires interacting with other explicitly non-imperial units. In the former case, 
these empires are seen as little more than particularly expansive and expansionist states, and 
the approach does relatively little to challenge or interrogate the discipline’s reliance on the 
nation-state as the default category of actor.11 The latter view provides a more compelling 
account of historical variance, either by emphasizing the heterogeneity of systems in which 
                                                
 
10 Tilly, ‘To Explain Political Processes’; Tilly, ’Mechanisms in Political Processes,’ Annual Review 
of Political Science, 4 (2001), pp. 21-42; Tilly, Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties (Boulder: 
Paradigm, 2005). 
11 See for example Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: 
Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Ernest 
Lefever, America’s Imperial Burden: Is the Past Prologue? (Boulder: Westview, 1999). 
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unlike units coexist and interact with one another or by telling stories of systemic 
development and changes over time in the units making up these systems.12  
While a case can be made for building on some of these more case sensitive unit-centric 
approaches by creating more historically informed typologies of state-forms in order to 
expand our horizons beyond the confines of the national-state, such a solution contains 
several problems.13 Perhaps the major issue with relying solely on improving our current 
typologies is that it runs the risk of merely replacing one set of reductionist assumptions with 
a series of others, replicating a teleological view of historical developments and ignoring the 
central place of contingency in the rise of the national-state as the standardized political 
organization of world politics. A theoretical perspective focused on units too easily leads to a 
view of history as proceeding from one system of similar political actors to another, seeing 
history as a trajectory moving from feudal states to imperial states to nation-states, with states 
generally adapting to each other and transforming according to the best practices of a given 
                                                
 
12 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Buzan and Little, International Systems in World 
History; Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); William Wohlforth et al, ‘Testing Balance-of-power 
Theory in World History’, European Journal of International Relations, 13:2 (2007), pp. 155-85; 
Alan Kwan, ‘Hierarchy, Status and International Society: China and the Steppe Nomads’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 22:2 (2016), pp. 362-83. 
13 For a particularly interesting example of the development of such typologies, see Yale Ferguson and 
Richard Mansbach, Polities: Authority, Identity, and Change (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1996). 
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period.14 It also lends itself too easily to Eurocentric explanations of historical developments, 
describing the spread of international norms and organizing principles as emanating outwards 
from Europe in a largely unilateral and monocausal fashion.15 
Recent work by Charles Butcher and Ryan Griffiths provides one of the sharpest 
formulations of the unit-centric perspective, while at the same time explicitly rejecting 
Eurocentrism. The two authors present a framework through which to study diverse state 
systems and international orders including those dominated by empires, which they see as 
qualitatively similar to other state forms. In their words, “more particular forms of the state – 
such as empire, national-state, or city-state – do not differ qualitatively from one another. 
Rather, they vary primarily in terms of their structural differentiation.”16 They argue that 
hierarchy and anarchy delineate the boundaries of the state, casting intra-state interactions as 
hierarchical and inter-state interactions as anarchic. In this way, states-as-units are the 
fundamental building blocks of international systems: “The coercion-wielding, foreign-
policymaking state is the lodestar for the study of systems and orders.”17 Butcher and 
Griffiths’ account is specifically a critique of what they term “Babel” – the plurality of 
studies of specific regional or historical state systems, offering different concepts or 
                                                
 
14 For the paradigmatic example of this type of analysis, see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the 
Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979). 
15 For a number of critiques that turn the Eurocentric view on its head, see Frederick Cooper and Ann 
Laura Stoler (eds), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western 
Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Shilliam, International Relations and 
Non-western Thought. 
16 Butcher and Griffiths, ‘Between Eurocentrism and Babel’, p. 334. 
17 Ibid. 
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terminologies to study each of them and thus making comparisons all the more difficult. 
Their argument, therefore, is essentially in favour of a more narrow definition of international 
systems in terms of their component parts – units – highlighting transhistorical commonalities 
between these, while acknowledging historical variance in the interaction capacity of 
different systems.18 However, this reification of unit-centric frameworks and restatement of 
what is essentially a well-established definition of the state is hardly the only way to conduct 
broad comparative analyses of different historical and geographical systems. One does not 
need a modernized version of the Weberian state to achieve analytical transposability.  
Andrew Phillips and Jason Sharman provide another recent contribution to the literature 
on historical international systems with their account of the early modern Indian Ocean. As 
they point out, very different polity types have in fact always coexisted, interacted with, and 
even transformed each other through this interaction, but this has far from always happened 
in a fashion leading to mutual homogenization.19 Phillips and Sharman present an interesting 
variation of the approach - they are explicitly interested in heterogeneous systems and they 
present a convincing historical corrective to state-centric accounts that argue for interaction 
leading to homogenization.20 But they are still predominantly casting states as units, and as 
they add complexity and nuance to the conception of state forms they simultaneously reify 
                                                
 
18 From Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, p. 80. 
19 Andrew Phillips and Jason Sharman, ‘Explaining Durable Diversity in International Systems: State, 
Company, and Empire in the Indian Ocean’, International Studies Quarterly, 59:3 (2015), pp. 436-48; 
Phillips, ‘Global IR Meets Global History: Sovereignty, Modernity and the International System’s 
Expansion in the Indian Ocean Region’, International Studies Review, 18:1 (2016), pp. 62-77. 
20 Phillips and Sharman, ‘Explaining Durable Diversity’, pp. 439-41. 
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the centrality of this unit in international systems.21 Even accounts that emphasize such unit-
level heterogeneity tend to fall short of adequately explaining the way in which empires 
operate in world politics. This is because imperial relations by their very nature involve 
spatial and political configurations that cannot be contained by the notion of well-bounded 
units. Imperial expansion and the spread of colonialism were in essence the negotiation, 
transformation and redrawing of boundaries, both territorial and political, fashioning new 
polities, blurring existing demarcations, and imposing altered hierarchical relations in the 
process. Any approach that regards empires primarily as states or state-like units fails to 
encapsulate the dynamics of this process, regardless of how sophisticated the typologies 
presented are. To put it differently, the hard distinction between inter-state anarchy and intra-
state hierarchy makes little sense when considering the history of imperial expansion and 
colonial encounters. 
This point leads to the second major approach to international systems and empire in IR – 
the social-relational perspective. This perspective tends to cast empire itself as a specific type 
of regional or international order or system, rather than as a discrete unit, emphasizing the 
relational nature of imperial ties.22 Developed primarily by Daniel Nexon, this approach is 
                                                
 
21 See also Jason Sharman, ‘Sovereignty at the Extremes: Micro-states in World Politics’, Political 
Studies 65:3 (2017), pp. 559-75. 
22 Nexon, The Struggle for Power; Andrew Phillips, War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation 
of International Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel Nexon and Paul 
Musgrave, ‘States of Empire: Liberal Ordering and Imperial Relations’, in Tim Dunne and Trine 
Flockhart (eds), Liberal World Orders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 211-30; 
Andersen, ‘Semi-cores in Imperial Relations’. 
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placed within the wider body of relational IR scholarship.23 Rather than envision the world as 
made up of discrete units and entities the relationalist perspective holds that what is important 
are the connections and transactions between these units, developing causal stories “by 
looking at configurations of processes.”24 Sociologist Mustafa Emirbayer puts the 
fundamental ontological dilemma as “whether to conceive of the social world as consisting 
primarily in substances or in processes, in static ‘things’ or in dynamic, unfolding 
relations.”25  
                                                
 
23 See in particular Tilly, ‘To Explain Political Processes’; Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 
‘Relations before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 5:3 (1999), pp. 291-332; Stacie Goddard, ‘Uncommon Ground: Indivisible 
Territory and the Politics of Legitimation’, International Organization, 60:1 (2006), pp. 35-68; Charli 
Carpenter, ‘Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in 
Transnational Advocacy Networks’, International Studies Quarterly, 51:1 (2007), pp. 99-120; Nexon, 
‘Relationalism and New Systems Theory’, in Mathias Albert et al (eds), New Systems Theories of 
World Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 99-126; Jackson and Nexon, ‘International 
Theory in a Post-paradigmatic Era: From Substantive Wagers to Scientific Ontologies’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 19:3 (2013), pp. 543-65; Edward Keene, ‘International Hierarchy 
and the Origins of the Practice of Intervention’, Review of International Studies, 39:5 (2013), pp. 
1077-90; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive 
Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society’, International Organization, 68:1 (2014), pp. 
143-76; Julian Go and George Lawson (eds), Global Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
24 Jackson and Nexon, ‘Relations before States’, p. 306. 
25 Mustafa Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’, The American Journal of Sociology, 
103:2 (1997), p. 281. 
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Instead of an attempt to collapse the differences between various units existing at the 
same time or fit them into fixed categories across periods, what this perspective provides is a 
way to examine first and foremost the relations within which these different units are 
embedded. By focusing on the positionalities of polities within hierarchical networks, the 
object of analysis becomes relations between units rather than the units themselves. Shifting 
the focus from unit-level state-centrism to the relational networks within which polities exist 
not only provides insights into the historical reality of world politics, but also breaks down 
some traditional dichotomies of the discipline –namely those of inside/outside, core/periphery, 
foreign/domestic and public/private. 26 If the primary types of interaction we are interested in 
in fact take place within, between, and across networked political configurations, then it 
makes little sense to talk about anything being inside or outside the “domestic sphere” or 
crossing over into some imagined “international sphere.” As Julian Go has pointed out, the 
adoption of a relational approach carries important implications for the way in which we 
conceive of the seeming binary nature of the colonial and postcolonial worlds.27 Approaching 
imperial configurations through a relational lens fundamentally destabilizes the idea that the 
metropolitan nations of the Occident and the colonial periphery of the Orient can somehow 
be seen as two discrete spheres. The binary between core and periphery, which allows 
                                                
 
26 On the problems of differentiating between public and private violence in historical IR in particular, 
see Tarak Barkawi, ‘State and Armed force in International Context’, in Alejandro Colás and Bryan 
Mabee (eds), Mercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in Historical Contexts 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 55-81 and Colás and Mabee ‘Private Violence in 
Historical Context,’ ibid., pp. 1-13, all arguing against the earlier account by Janice Thomson 
(Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in 
Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)).  
27 Julian Go, ‘For a Postcolonial Sociology,’ Theory and Society, 42:1 (2013), pp. 41-3. 
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scholars to think of the diffusion of institutions and practices as taking place through a one-
way conduit, relies on a substantialist view of the actors involved. Using the concepts of 
core-periphery, even in a strictly analytical sense, implicitly accepts the viewpoint of empire 
by designating parts of the globe as “peripheries” and parts as “cores,” but as Go puts it, “in 
relational thought, there would be precious little allowance for metrocentrism.”28 
The relational perspective has proved especially apt at analysing empire because of the 
distinctive nature of imperial relations described above. Relationalism allows us to 
acknowledge at the same time the hierarchical nature of imperial order and the networked 
structure of empires. However, in its current form the approach possesses certain limits of its 
own and there is still much work to be done in mapping out how reconfigurations take place 
and thus cause changes to international systems. Two issues in particular stand out, one 
conceptual and the other empirical. Conceptually the network-relational literature on empire 
has yet to fully engage with the literature coming out of the practice turn, despite the shared 
theoretical space of the two perspectives.29 This is a missed opportunity, since practice theory 
would contribute to a more fleshed-out account of the manifestation of social ties and provide 
network-relational accounts with a better apparatus to analyse change over time in world 
politics. A synthesis of the two frameworks would also go some way towards overcoming the 
conceptual instability and internal tension within network analysis, highlighted in recent 
critiques by Emily Erikson. 30  It would do so by moving further away from formal 
structuralism and foregrounding historical transformations and reconfigurations as central 
                                                
 
28 Ibid., 42. 
29 See David McCourt, ‘Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism’, International 
Studies Quarterly, 60:3 (2016), pp. 475-85 
30 Emily Erikson, ‘Formalist and Relationalist Theory in Social Network Analysis’, Sociological 
Theory, 31:3 (2013), pp. 219-42.  
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topics of study.31 Empirically, relational accounts of empire in IR have tended to be overly 
focused on empires as systems rather than empires as parts of systems. This means that while 
much work has been done on the dynamics within imperial formations, less attention has 
been paid to interactions across and between empires. This matters a great deal, in part 
because it risks inadvertently adding to the starkly binary view of hierarchy and anarchy as 
taking place within and outside polities respectively, and in part because it misses some of the 
major sources of historical change in international systems dominated by rival empires. I will 
return to both of these issues below, after laying out the general contours of my proposed re-
conceptualization.  
 
Re-conceptualizing empires and international systems 
Building on some of the accounts described above, I believe the best way to think of 
international systems is as follows: International systems and the activities taking place 
within them - that is to say world politics - are fundamentally composed of multiple partially 
overlapping and interrelated networks. These networks are not congruent with the polities or 
states which have traditionally been seen as making up the system (the “units”), since polities 
themselves are formed from particular configurations of networks. The networks are 
composed of social ties - as in classic network-relational analysis - but also of 
specific practices or repertoires of practice. As an example, early modern trading networks 
were made up of both the social ties between specific merchants and companies and of the 
                                                
 31	  For examples of similar moves in Sociology, see Peter Bearman and Emily Erikson, ‘Malfeasance 
and the Foundations for Global Trade: The Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601-1833’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 112:1 (2006), pp. 195-230; Paul D. McLean and John F. Padgett, 
‘Organizational Invention and Elite Transformation: The Birth of Partnership Systems in Renaissance 
Florence’, American Journal of Sociology, 111:5 (2006), pp. 1463-568.	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commercial, social, legal, and cultural practices through which their interactions took place. 
Practices do not stand on their own but are bundled together in repertoires, representing the 
available actions, expected behavior, and cultural knowledge of groups in a given context.32 
These practices facilitate interactions, meaning that actors outside the networks can plug into 
them by learning and adopting their specific repertoires, becoming part of the networks on a 
temporary or permanent basis. In this sense networks are malleable and prone to expansion or 
protraction, and they are transformed both through shifts in social ties and through significant 
changes in their practices. 33  
It is crucial to note that power permeates the social ties that connect groups and 
individuals. This means that most if not all of the networks constituting an international 
system are fundamentally hierarchical. Whether this hierarchy is formal or informal, in a 
political-legal sense, depends on the specific repertoire of a given network. In other words, 
divided or layered sovereignty through formal colonization or annexation is different from 
influencing the foreign or trade policy of another polity (through something like "informal 
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empire"), not because one involves hierarchical exertions of power and the other does not, 
but because these power relations are expressed through different repertoires of practice.34  
Transformations in international systems thus happen through the reconfiguration of the 
networks composing these systems. Expansion or protraction of networks across space - 
political and geographical - is one example. Another example of systemic transformation is 
the change or replacement of a network's repertoires of practice. These two types of 
transformation often go hand-in-hand, as networks expand and incorporate new polities or 
regions, changing or adapting their practices in the process. In this way, a major driver of 
historical transformations has been the expansion of imperial polities and their encounters 
with other polities and other regional systems.  
To restate and elucidate the above proposition and relate it more directly to the 
phenomenon of empire, allow me to unpack the two theoretical moves I am suggesting. The 
first is to more explicitly combine network-relational analysis with practice theory, creating 
an integrated approach that takes account of both relational configurations and the practices 
through which they are manifested. This is similar to David McCourt’s argument that practice 
theory and relationalism are in fact closely linked theoretical perspectives, constituting the 
two sides of what he terms “the new constructivism.”35 The concept of practice used here 
mainly follows the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu36 and draws on aspects of the 
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recent practice turn in IR.37 Practices are exceedingly important as vehicles for forging 
connections and defining positionalities within networks. In this sense practice analysis is 
especially relevant as an analytical tool for the study of colonialism and imperial expansion, 
since colonial empires were to a great extent made up of relatively decentralized networks 
with little overarching policy or strategy dictating their actions. Shared practices were thus 
important on at least two levels – first in an intra-imperial context, as drivers of imperial 
projects in lieu of a centralized grand strategy; and second on the inter-imperial level, 
fostering modes of political interaction between empires, whether these took place at the level 
of metropolitan treaty negotiations or in the day-to-day contact zones of intercolonial 
borderlands and frontier regions.  
Practices such as these, similar to what Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper have labelled 
“imperial repertoires,” are especially crucial in differentiating imperial polities across time 
and space.38 While some practices are shared between most empires, others vary widely, 
situated as they are in the particular cultural, political, or geographic context of the empire in 
question. The Mongol Empire, as an example, looked quite different from most other Asian 
empires, combining a remarkable protection of cultural and religious diversity within the 
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empire with the threat of extensive violence, bordering on complete destruction, for polities 
on the verge of conquest, carried out by a roaming nomadic elite.39 In contrast, the Spanish 
Empire of the early modern period depended on the practice of converting new subjects to 
achieve a certain level of religious, if not cultural, unity, and relied primarily on local 
intermediaries for large territorial conquest in the Americas, as seen by the way in which 
Maya polities were effectively conquered by central Mexican, or Aztec, forces rather than by 
Spanish conquistadors themselves.40 Thus, while empire as a mode of organizing political 
power and authority has been constant throughout much of world history, the practices 
through which empires operated have varied considerably and are worth analysing in order to 
understand the specific dynamics of any given empire or period, as well as changes in these 
over time.  
The focus on common practices shares theoretical space with another framework for 
studying empire – Julian Go’s global field theory. In his broad comparative account of British 
                                                
 
39 Ibid., pp. 31-63; Joseph Fletcher, ‘The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives’, Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies, 46:1 (1986), pp. 11-50; Thomas Allsen, Mongol Imperialism: The Policies 
of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic lands, 1251-1259 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1987). It should be pointed out that, while starkly different from East Asian 
empires, there were important precedents for some of the Mongol practices in earlier steppe empires, 
including that of the Uighurs. See Michal Biran, ‘The Mongol Transformation: From the Steppe to 
Eurasian Empire’, Medieval Encounters, 10:1-3 (2004), pp. 341-3; Iver Neumann and Einar Wigen, 
‘The Importance of the Eurasian Steppe to the Study of International Relations’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 16:3 (2013), pp. 311-30. 
40 Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 21 
and American empires, Go argues that empires are best though of as “located in wider global 
fields of conflict and competition as they reach across, through, and down to more localized 
settings of power relations. Embedded in and moving about these fields and power relations, 
empires are in turn shaped by them.”41 Go focuses on what he terms the hegemonic phases, or 
life cycles, of imperial formations, as their relative rise or decline forces them towards 
different strategies of expansion and competition.42 Fields are different from networks, 
however, and while both emphasize the importance of positionality, fields are more 
abstracted and macro-level analytical constructs.43 While field theory is good at highlighting 
continuity, it lacks a more granular theory of change over time, especially when it comes to 
explaining shifts in the practices dominating specific fields. In this sense, pairing a focus on 
repertoires of practice with the specificity and emphasis on interaction provided by network 
analysis offers a more fine-grained explanatory framework for understanding historical 
change. It also allows us to focus less on specific polities and more on the networks that cut 
across these political entities, further decentralizing the unit as the primary object of study. 
The second theoretical move I propose is to focus more directly on the interaction 
between and across those networked configurations that constitute individual polities. The 
relational approach to empire has so far not been particularly adept at handling situations in 
which the empire being studied is not conterminous with the system itself. In other words, 
empires are typically cast as a certain type of international system along the lines of other 
ideal-typical systems, like hegemonic or multipolar ones, which fails to account for what 
happens at the aggregate level when multiple empires exist in competition with one another. 
                                                
 
41 Go, Patterns of Empire, pp. 240-1. 
42 Ibid., 19-27, 166-205. 
43 See also John Levi Martin, ‘What is Field Theory?’, American Journal of Sociology, 109:1 (2003), 
pp. 1-49. 
 22 
Studies at this level of inter-imperial rivalry tend not to see empires as networked 
configurations, despite a commitment to a relational framework, but rather slip back into the 
view of them as a distinct type of large state-unit. While this issue no doubt partly stems from 
authors using the names of political communities – states and empires – as shorthand when 
presenting empirical cases, there is an underlying tendency to think of such communities as 
bounded and separable units with relatively little interaction of the sort we are interested in 
happening across boundaries, even when acknowledging the networked nature of 
international systems.  
This is particularly problematic since colonial overseas empires – arguably the most 
important type of empire over the past five hundred years - always existed in relationship to 
other empires. Moreover, they did not solely or even predominantly exist in a state of discrete 
rivalry, similar to that proposed by many advocates of the empires-as-states perspective, but 
rather in a messy state of entanglement, competition, and cooperation.44 The relations 
between empires at any given time were not uniform across all levels of interaction, but quite 
often varied dramatically between different points of connectivity, leading to one perspective 
at the metropolitan level and quite different ones in the various colonial borderlands spread 
across the globe.  
Even sophisticated relational accounts of empire that are explicitly focused on social ties 
below the systemic level, including the work of Paul MacDonald, have mostly limited their 
analysis to interactions within a single empire or between an empire and non-imperial polities 
during the process of conquest, in effect reproducing at least partially the centre-periphery 
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dynamic of the more systemic approaches mentioned above.45 In order to appreciate the 
dynamics of situations with multiple imperial polities competing and cooperating over 
territory and influence, it is important to cast empire not as a single networked system, such 
as the typical hub-and-spoke model, but rather as a number of different partially-overlapping 
networks operating with varying centres of gravity.  
As mentioned above the networks in which social and political interactions are embedded 
are rarely based on positional equality between actors, but more often build upon relations of 
power and hierarchical ordering. This is no less true for imperial configurations than for other 
polities, given the layered and uneven sovereignty of empire.46 Indeed, this emphasis of 
hierarchy is one of the key insights of the relational approach to imperial systems. However, 
hierarchies are not restricted to the domain of intra-imperial politics. Multiple hierarchies 
often overlap, embedding polities within different networks and prescribing them different 
roles dependent on their positionality within each. The factors determining positionality 
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within each network depend on their specific logics of hierarchy, which tend to vary 
considerably from case to case.47  
The practices on which these networks are constituted, and which are in turn used to 
manoeuvre within them, also varies – from legal posturing and commercial transactions to 
tributary diplomacy and show of force. Indeed, there are typically multiple layers of networks, 
tied into different legal, political and commercial practices, and these are not necessarily 
neatly overlapping and might well shift over time. They are not necessarily tied to one 
imperial power either, but might well span multiple empires at once or be tied to several 
colonial or commercial groups nominally belonging to different metropoles. While initial 
imperial expansion into new territories might focus on one set of practices, other networks 
are likely to follow at later stages as other actors and colonial institutions are mobilized or 
expanded. One set of relations will often precede others, creating a staggered or segmented 
process of colonization – commercial networks might be the first stage in the process, 
followed by legal networks attempting to secure rights and privileges of imperial merchants, 
and then eventually joined by political and military as part of outright annexation. In this 
sense the classic distinction in history between formal and informal empires is at least 
partially dissolved,48 since all imperial configurations are composed of multiple networks 
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based on different practices, usually layered in ways to exert dominance in one or more 
spheres, and which practices dominate relations at any given time have more to do with 
stages of a process than with the inherent nature of a given empire.  
 
Generative colonialism: Imperial expansion as a driver of change 
Historically imperial expansion was an exceptional driver of transformation at the level of 
both regional and global systems. The spread of colonialism forced political experimentation 
in local colonial configurations, both on the part of imperial governments and of local polities 
resisting or pre-empting colonial incursions and takeovers. Through the process of 
colonization new polities were formed and old polities were altered or destroyed, highlighting 
at once the generative and the destructive forces of colonialism.49  
The changes fostered at the margins of expanding empires caused transformations at the 
systemic level, as encounters between these empires and local heterogeneous polities altered 
repertoires of practice and realigned pre-existing networks while causing new ones to emerge. 
The encounters that took place as imperial networks expanded to include new subjects and 
territories were central to the formation of international systems, making further expansion 
possible and rendering various modes of political organization either legible to one another, 
subject to forceful subjugation or both. These colonial encounters composed new laws, 
fashioned new political ideas, increased the reach of power, expanded the scope of 
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knowledge about the world and carved out new categories of identity and classification. 
Liminal interactions were thus at the centre of changes in the international system. 
Colonialism as a generative force should not be taken as any sort of normative statement, 
but rather as a historical observation – colonialism was among the strongest forces 
influencing experimentation of the state form, particularly in the long nineteenth century. The 
process of colonization shaped fundamental institutions and practices, both in specific 
colonies and within empires at large. Indeed, colonialism was a significant driver of state 
formation in general, or, perhaps more accurately, of state transformation and development. 
Some of this transformation was carried out by colonizers and imperial administrators who 
claimed territories and created new institutions, but other parts of it were driven by the very 
people facing potential incorporation by outside forces and who attempted to stave off such 
incursions by refashioning their own polities and political institutions.  
Colonialism drove political experimentation in both direct and indirect ways. Even when 
European imperialism was more ambition than reality on the ground, as in much of sub-
Saharan Africa of the nineteenth century or in East Asia, the presence of imperial networks 
and the possibility of European incursion spurred a variety of local political experiments and 
adaptive strategies. This was clearly the case in places as diverse as Hawai’i, Japan and West 
Africa, which all underwent significant institutional reform as a result of colonial threats in 
the nineteenth century.50   
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Colonialism was a generative force in a more direct fashion when treaties were drawn up 
and territories claimed, wholly or partially. These actions fashioned new political spaces or 
altered existing ones by redrawing borders and adding new layers of sovereignty. Whether it 
was by strategically recognizing existing polities and altering the hierarchies within which 
they were embedded prior to colonisation, as was done with Buganda by the British East 
Africa Company in the 1890s,51 or by fashioning new polities entirely, as with the 
demarcation and creation of Rhodesia in the same decade,52 the process of colonization 
proved remarkably powerful at radically altering the political landscape of the nineteenth 
century.  
The process of colonialism thus fostered new political configurations at a number of 
different stages. The threat of colonization spurred on local reforms and led to the use of a 
variety of adaptive strategies; colonization itself created new political configurations and 
often influenced practices and institutions in the local polities being colonized as well as in 
other parts of the empire, whether in the metropole or in other colonies; and the process of 
decolonization offered another critical juncture, a new generative moment of possible 
experimentation and adoption of new or rediscovered institutions and state forms.   
                                                                                                                                                  
see Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European 
International Society (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 114-39; Alistair Swale The Meiji 
Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 1-56; William Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), pp. 1-40. The West African example is discussed in further detail below. 
51 John Mugambwa ‘A “Protected State” in the Uganda Protectorate? Re-examination of Buganda’s 
Colonial Legal Status’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1:3 (1989), pp. 446-
65. 
52 John Galbraith, Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 128-53. 
 28 
 
Colonial configurations in the nineteenth century  
A major theme in the scholarship on the history of international systems has been the 
importance of the nineteenth century as an unparalleled moment of transformation.53 The 
century saw historical changes unprecedented in both scale and intensity, and while these 
were not developments that led to a full homogenization of the state form, it should be clear 
for anyone engaged in scholarship on the non-Western world that something happened in the 
nineteenth century that decidedly and fundamentally altered the relationship between Western 
imperial powers and the rest of the globe. The changes wrought to regional systems by 
imperial expansion grew in reach and scale to such a degree that a truly global international 
system began to materialize, even if it was not yet fully fledged by the end of the century. 
What follows is a brief sketch of some of the peculiar imperial configurations of the long 
nineteenth century, as seen through the practice-relational lens presented above. This is by no 
means a comprehensive analysis of nineteenth century international systems, but rather an 
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examination of three particularly interesting examples of complex layered spaces shaped in 
various ways by imperial expansion, meant to illustrate the usefulness of the framework 
proposed in this article. The examples presented here include the Gold Coast in West Africa, 
the Qing Empire in East Asia and Samoa in the South Pacific. Each of them has been chosen 
to illuminate particular aspects of colonial and imperial configurations of the period, offering 
very different geographical and political settings. They illustrate in turn the relationship 
between indigenous and European polities in a regional system where European power was 
tenuous at best; the processes of multiple concurrent European incursions into a regional 
system dominated by a powerful, if weakened, Asian empire; and political and legal 
competition over the colonial division of a single insular space at the tail-end of western 
imperial expansion, providing a blueprint of sorts for future inter-state legal arrangements at 
the margins of a near-global international system.  
All three of these historical examples can be analysed through a myriad of different lenses, 
including a traditional unit-centred view, but it is my contention that key aspects of each one 
are only brought to light by employing a relational perspective – and specifically a relational 
perspective emphasising repertoires of practice and inter-polity networks. By focusing on the 
relations between the many polities existing in these spaces and analysing the shifts in 
positionalities within their networks, a fuller picture of the rise of European imperial power in 
the long nineteenth century begins to emerge. Because imperial and colonial expansion was 
such a crucial component of the rise of the western-dominated political order in the period, a 
better understanding of the dynamics of this expansion should be a central concern for 
anyone interested in the historical development of the increasingly global international 
system. 
 
The Gold Coast 
 30 
The West African coast provided the grounds for a curious set of relations between European 
and indigenous polities. Following initial contact, these different polities became entangled 
within networks of interdependence and competition, and the rise or decline in power of one 
polity would send ripples across the region, forcing its neighbours to either adapt or submit. 
In the area of the Gulf of Guinea referred to by Europeans as the Gold Coast, the winding 
coastline provided multiple points of entry for a number of different European commercial 
groups.54 At various points in time, agents from Brandenburg, Britain, Denmark, the Dutch 
Republic, Portugal and Sweden built or repossessed a range of fortifications and outposts 
along the coast. These agents sought alliances with different indigenous polities in order to 
protect their agents and to secure the flow of trade – the most profitable of which was in 
human bodies. 
All of the European companies on the coast were dependent on alliances with African 
elites in order to maintain their positions and secure their profits. This dependency led to a 
multi-layered zone of overlapping networks, with connections both between different 
European groups and between Africans and Europeans, creating a strong interdependence 
between trading partners and uneven and ambiguous hierarchies.55 Moreover, even if distant 
observers in European metropoles held significant disdain for the capacities of indigenous 
polities, it was fully acknowledged by Europeans on the ground that there were large swathes 
of the African coast where “the Negroes are the Masters,” in the words of one British 
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governor.56 These networks were thus clearly hierarchical, but power relations within them 
were not one-sided and shifted over the course of the century.  
The rise of the Asante Empire at the dawn of the nineteenth century led to a significant 
shift in the balance of power on the coast and to the dynamics of the regional system. 
Historically primarily an inland polity, the Asante came to realize the promise of wealth and 
resources associated with coastal access, and through a number of local wars with other 
African polities in the decade between 1806 and 1816 it forced the foreign empires present 
there to acknowledge its power and reach. This acknowledgement was codified in 1817, 
when representatives from the British African Company of Merchants signed a treaty 
partially recognizing Asante claims to much of the coastal territory as well as its African 
inhabitants.57 Not willing to bow down to an indigenous power quite so readily, the British 
agents on the ground continued to circumvent Asante officials, leading to more direct 
confrontations throughout the 1820s and culminating in a new treaty in 1831, this time 
decidedly altering the regional system. 58  
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The presence of European imperial powers combined with the growing threat from the 
indigenous Asante Empire sowed the seed for a new type of political formation among the 
previously disparate Fante polities on the coast, significantly altering their repertoires of 
practice. The jostling of competing imperial powers on the coast made old practices 
impossible and obstructed existing African networks, even as new possibilities of 
engagement opened up. In the second half of the eighteenth century Fante networks came 
together in a more organized fashion under the leadership of the Coastal Coalition, and in the 
nineteenth century the strongest coastal polities formed the Fante Confederation, complete 
with judiciary, executive council, and constitution, ratified in 1868.59 The adaptive strategy of 
the Fante polities, brought about by colonial contact and the threat of imperial annexation 
from two sides, thus led to the creation of political configurations hitherto unseen on the 
African coast. This generative effect of the colonial encounter was not limited to the local 
context of the Gold Coast, but had wider reverberations that influenced subsequent state 
formation in colonial and postcolonial Africa. 
While a story of the rise of and response to the Asante Empire can be told through a lens 
that casts empires merely as expansive great powers, such an analysis misses key elements of 
the historical process. Likewise, an intra-imperial perspective focusing on the African coast 
as a peripheral zone of conquest for the British Empire risks ignoring the interactions 
between the various polities on the ground, European as well as African. Instead, a focus on 
the existing coastal networks between European and African groups and the emergence of the 
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Asante as an outside threat to these networks points towards a more incisive explanation of 
historical events. Not only did the relative insularity of early coastal networks and the 
constant ebb and flow of alliances make Asante incursions possible, given the inland 
empire’s liminal status vis-à-vis these interactions, but the resulting realignment of relations 
and shifts in positionalities ultimately paved the way for a reconfigured regional system 
under British hegemony several decades later,60 which placed both Asante and Fante polities 
in a clearly subordinate relationship to the government of the new British crown colony.61 
 
The Qing Empire 
The Chinese Empire under the Qing Dynasty was of an altogether different nature than the 
polity federations of the Atlantic world. Building on the institutions of a centuries-old 
bureaucratic polity in China and claiming both the mandate of heaven and the symbolic 
mantle of earlier steppe empires, the Qing represented both departure from and continuation 
of previous imperial dynasties.62 Most notably, it gave rise to the most aggressive 
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expansionary policy in centuries as China grew far beyond its earlier borders, annexing large 
swathes of westward territory over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.63 
The expansion and governance of the empire included examples of a variety of different 
imperial and colonial practices. Its projection of power ranged from the colonial annexations 
of Tibet, Taiwan and Inner Mongolia to the tributary relations with Joseon and Ryūkyū, and 
its modes of internal control included both ethnic differentiation of its subjects and the 
fashioning of a distinct martial culture at the heart of the imperial project.64 All of these 
activities seemingly cemented the Qing Empire’s place at the centre of the international 
system of East Asia, even as European encroachments at the margins began to alter the 
foundations of this system. 
While carrying on its own large-scale imperial project, China saw a gradually expanding 
European presence on its southern coast, beginning with the Portuguese colonization of 
Macau in the sixteenth century, during the Ming Dynasty, and culminating in the 1842 Treaty 
of Nanking, which not only ceded Hong Kong to the British but also signalled the beginning 
of a more clearly hierarchical dimension to the Sino-European relationship.  While sixteenth 
and seventeenth century incursions into China were primarily carried out by small groups of 
individual agents, often from a single empire, such as the Portuguese in Macau and the spice 
traders of the Dutch East India Company, the eighteenth century saw the introduction of the 
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Canton system, which created a multi-imperial zone around the thirteen factories of the 
Canton harbour (present-day Guangzhou).65 Although this system put some means of 
controlling the flow of commerce into the hands of the Chinese government, it proved 
impossible to stop local European and American merchant networks, often based in less-
tightly controlled Macau, from engaging in a variety of illicit commercial practices, 
smuggling goods in and out of the country despite official British attempts at enforcing some 
trade restrictions.66 
The Treaty of Nanking and the establishment of Hong Kong as a British colony gave way 
to a new form of treaty-based imperial incursions into China expanding outside the southern 
shores. The first major consequence of this was the treaty port system along the coast,67 the 
most famous port being that of Shanghai. Following the creation of the United Municipal 
Council in 1854, Shanghai became a uniquely institutionalized inter-polity zone populated by 
a number of inter-imperial networks. The Council saw representatives from most of the 
Western empires as well as the Qing Empire divide the city between them, creating a space of 
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complex and overlapping sovereignty in the process.68 This was a space of sophisticated legal 
jockeying and intricate imperial partitioning surpassing any other region at the time, as 
external imperial powers divided the Chinese city into zones of their own. Each empire made 
claims to commercial and jurisdictional powers in a way that turned on its head the tenuous 
hierarchy between the Qing and foreign empires, established a century earlier in Canton.  
The spread of western influence on the Chinese coast was a prime example of colonial 
expansion taking place through a series of networks based on different repertoires of practice. 
The early commercial networks thus paved the way for later diplomatic and jurisdictional 
incursions, the partial failure of which ultimately led to outright colonization of certain 
contact zones. This was not a long-term strategy employed by western empires, however, but 
originated from the actions of individual and sometimes unrelated groups of actors on the 
ground, whose acitivity had ramifications for the political process and sometimes served as 
an excuse for the implementation of one policy or another.  Indeed, most of the commercial 
networks were not easily classifiable as belonging to one empire or another, but were rather 
trans-imperial in nature, working towards a more or less mutual goal of profit from the China 
trade. China in turn was not a monolithic imperial polity, but was composed of multiple 
different networks, not all of which worked towards the same goal of maintaining a specific 
Sino-centric geopolitical order. This was true well before the outbreak of that most bloody of 
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nineteenth century civil wars, the Taiping Rebellion, in the middle decades of the century.69 
Indeed, without the collaboration of local Chinese merchants and middlemen and their 
gradual integration into relatively robust commercial networks, the European trade on the 
coast would never have been as successful as it was, nor would the colonies of Hong Kong, 
Macau or Shanghai have seen the growth they did.70 
The Qing Empire was a multifaceted colonial polity, displaying a wide array of imperial 
practices that reinforced and expanded the hierarchical networks on which its rule was based. 
While the Qing had sophisticated strategies of dealing with neighbouring regional powers, 
their political approach to imperial polities originating from beyond the seas ultimately 
proved insufficient to tackle the enormity of the challenge posed by Western powers, which 
themselves were as incapable as the Qing of envisioning a hierarchical order without 
themselves at the top.71 
The incursion into China of foreign colonial networks also had ramifications for the 
nineteenth century conception of international legal institutions. In particular, the colonial 
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encounter in China generated one of the more interesting and overlooked inter-imperial 
bodies of the period – the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. This institution was a 
formalization of some of the inter-imperial networks within China that became a generative 
force in its own right, shaping many of the practices that propped up the Qing state in the late 
nineteenth century and fostering China’s integration into the growing, western-dominated, 
international system. Initially established by European colonial consuls in Shanghai in the 
1850s, the Chinese government nominally controlled the Customs Service, which came to 
generate more revenue for the Qing state than any other single institution at the turn of the 
century.72 The Service was at once a Chinese and an inter-imperial organization, drawing 
legal authority from both Qing and foreign empires and staffed by foreigners at all but the 
lowest levels, especially during the first decades of its existence. It not only signalled a new 
period of formalization of inter-imperial relations in the late nineteenth century, but also 
drove seminal reforms of other Chinese state institutions well into the Republican period, 
which in turn made China a more legible political space to foreign actors.73  
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The Samoan Islands, first referred to by European explorers as the Navigator Islands, 
presents the final example of a multi-layered colonial space. As every corner of the globe had 
been nominally claimed for one empire or another, the few remaining territories that could be 
colonized were beset by competing agents of empire, clamouring for control and seeking new 
ways in which to divide and rule indigenous polities. While the first encounters between 
Europeans and Samoans took place in the waning decades of the eighteenth century, the 
middle of the nineteenth century saw a growing number of foreign trading networks passing 
through the region and establishing a presence there.  
Commercial groups from both Western Europe and North America became increasingly 
invested in the fate of Samoa, and the three main foreign powers on the islands – Britain, the 
US and Germany – all escalated their political presence in the last decades of the century. 
Representatives of these empires made claims to harbour rights and extraterritoriality for their 
agents and forged alliances with local political elites in what at least some powers saw as a 
competition to “hold Samoa commercially, as well as politically” as one German diplomat 
put it, rather undiplomatically.74 In contrast to this aggressive policy, other imperial agents 
saw their task as one of reaching a stable balance of power. British Commissioner J. B. 
Thurston was thus instructed to find the “means of promoting the autonomy and peaceful 
government of the islands by their native authority,” since “the present neutral status of the 
Samoan Islands” was to be “maintained by the joint influence of the three Treaty Powers … 
each continuing to exclude from consideration questions of annexation or individual 
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predominance.”75 At the same time as Britain worked to maintain the status quo, the self-
governing colony of New Zealand lobbied intensely for gaining territorial control of Samoa. 
In the words of Thurston, New Zealand’s government “evinced a desire for a general 
annexation of the islands of the Pacific not under the jurisdiction of any civilized power.”76  
On the face of it, Samoa is the example presented here that seems to most easily fit with a 
traditional unit-centric conception of empire, emphasising the tenuous and shifting balance of 
power between the three empires at the end of the century. However, even in this case such 
an approach risks missing crucial aspects of the process leading to formal colonization and 
the ultimate shape this colonization took. In particular, the three empires were not unitary 
state actors operating within their respective national interests, but rather multi-layered 
networked entities with different internal foci and sometimes-competing aims. The clearest 
example of this was New Zealand, which, while itself a colony of Britain, displayed its own 
foreign and colonial policy with goals quite different from those of its imperial metropole. 
But networks below the level of official colonial politics were arguably equally important. 
For years leading up to the outbreak of overt political rivalry over Samoa in the 1880s, 
European and American commercial networks had laid the groundwork for expanding their 
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spheres of influence in the South Pacific, establishing trade practices and in effect bringing 
empire to the region well before this became a political priority at the metropolitan level. 
These expanding imperial networks on the islands in turn affected the political processes 
of indigenous groups, leading to an intensification of existing factionalism and 
geographically based alliances and ultimately leading to the eruption of the first Samoan 
Civil War in 1886. The role of the Samoan king, which previously seemed to have been an 
office more akin to the ceremonial leader of a decision making process characterized by intra-
elite negotiations, now became laden with expectations on the part of foreign agents. As 
Robert Louis Stevenson described it in his then-controversial A Footnote to History, 
“although the credit side of the account proves thus imaginary, the debit side is actual and 
heavy” for the king “is now set up to be the mark of consuls; he will be badgered to raise 
taxes, to make roads, to punish crime, to quell rebellion: and how he is to do it is not asked.”77 
The conflict between the three foreign empires initially concluded with the Treaty of 
Berlin, signed in 1889 and making Samoa a tripartite condominium under a joint protectorate 
of all three powers, while still retaining a nominal recognition of the independence of the 
Samoan government. 78 This treaty is interesting in its formal institutionalization of an inter-
imperial network, in effect creating a realm of shared sovereignty alongside some degree of 
local autonomy and a thoroughly international Supreme Court of Justice, whose chief Justice 
could in the last instance be appointed by an outside third party in the form of the King of 
Sweden and Norway.  
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While the creation of the condominium went some way towards quelling the internal 
Samoan war, it only lasted a decade as violence again reached a high point in 1898, leading at 
that point to the ultimate partitioning and colonization of the islands by Germany and the 
United States the following year. The process of colonization in Samoa created novel 
institutions of inter-imperial legal cooperation, further strengthening the role of law and 
institution-making at the furthest reaches of the international system, which with the 
annexation of Polynesia now spanned the entirety of the globe. In the context of indigenous 
Samoan polities and culture colonization was a more unambiguously destructive force, 
however, undermining and eroding pre-colonial repertoires of practice without replacing 
them with much of anything. 
 
Conclusion 
A focus on imperial interaction, colonial expansion and local responses is the first step 
towards illuminating the relationship between empire and transformations in international 
systems. As destructive a phenomenon for indigenous cultures and institutions as the 
expansion of colonial empires undeniably was, the spread of colonialism was also a 
generative phenomenon, opening up spaces for new polity formations and creating a new 
breadth of political experimentation borne out of the dynamics of subjugation, resistance and 
adaptation. Systemic transformations thus took place at the margins of empire, through 
interaction and accompanying reconfiguration Although the examples presented in the 
previous section all stem from the nineteenth century, the transformative effects of imperial 
expansion have clearly influenced the contemporary international system. Even as the 
imperial powers implemented a new polity model in their former colonial territories 
following 1945 – that of the modern national-state – sovereignty in practice remained 
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ambiguous, layered and incomplete throughout the twentieth century.79 Historical legacies are 
hard to shake off, and many of the networks formed in past centuries can still be found across 
the globe today,80 just as new hierarchical relationships are being established.81 
While the focus of the present article has been on empires and inter-imperial relations, the 
implications are broader in nature. Instead of continuing largely within unit-based 
frameworks of analysis, IR would do well to embrace a network-relational and practice-
oriented approach to the study of international systems. Such an embrace would not 
necessitate strict uniformity in methodological approach or in topics of analysis, but would 
rather imply a set of broadly shared assumptions about the topography of world politics. 
Moving beyond unit-centric frameworks and adopting a truly global point of view makes it 
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clear that there can be no clear-cut division into cores and peripheries, as these are inherently 
spatially anchored notions and one polity’s periphery is another polity’s core. While the 
African West Coast might have been at the periphery of the British Empire for much of the 
nineteenth century, it was at the core of both the Asante Empire and the Fante Confederation, 
in the same way that the South China Coast came to be at the core of the Qing Empire while 
being at the periphery of most European powers. 
The notion that more attention needs to be paid to those aspects of world politics that do 
not map onto neatly divisible state-like units goes well beyond the realm of historical empires 
and colonisation. Inter-polity hierarchies and transnational networks of violence and of 
governance are not just things of the past, but features of contemporary world politics. By 
recasting the way we think about international systems, the temporary nature and historical 
contingency of the current inter-state system is thrown into stark relief and potential sources 
of change appear less obscured. Systemic transformations do not happen in sudden tectonic 
shifts, but through the constant re-constitution and gradual adaptation of practices and 
through the expansion or protraction of interrelated boundary-crossing networks. Such 
reconfigurations are very much taking place today, whether broadly acknowledged or not. 
By seeking out and mapping the various interrelated networks in which interactions are 
embedded, and especially the repertoires of practice and the logics of hierarchy ordering 
these networks, we can ultimately gain a clearer understanding of the processes that 
reconfigure international systems and drive change in world politics. This would move us 
closer to an understanding of why certain political configurations become the primary actors 
in given regions and periods as opposed to others, and why some polity types persist for a 
long time while others are subsumed, subjugated or fall away.  
 
